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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 70s there was an ... anti-war slogan: "What if they held a war and
nobody came?" The contemporary... counterpart to this would be
"What if we staged a revolution and nobody noticed?"
-Handy Fuse, Simply Appalling'
The Supreme Court has staged a federalism revolution, but no-
body noticed. Well, actually, many have noticed that some kind of
revolution is happening, but few can make much sense of it, and
nearly everyone has missed a piece that is revolutionary in its own
right.2 To many, the Court seems to be limiting the power of the fed-
eral government and expanding that of the states, as recent Com-
merce Clause, Tenth Amendment, and Eleventh Amendment cases
suggest.3 But at the same time that it has expanded state power in
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Simply Appalling: A Jaundiced Eye on the News, http://simplyappalling.blogspot.com/
2005/05/second-american-revolution-goes.html (May 16, 2005). This statement appeared as
part of a post on right-wing revolutions and nuclear weapons. The original antiwar slogan is
probably derived from a poem by Carl Sandburg, who wrote, "Sometime they'll give a war and
nobody will come." CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 43 (1936). The sentiment has under-
gone a number of permutations in service of variois goals, and this permutation seemed ap-
propriate to this topic.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court: An Admiring Reply to Profes-
sor Merrill, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 659, 659 (2003) (critiquing Professor Merrill's "stunning article"
ana! zing the Rehnquist Court as "incomplete in a few important respects").
See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitu-
tional Experience, 51 DUKE LJ. 223, 233-41 (2001) [hereinafter Jackson, Narratives] (discussing
recent Supreme Court case law on federalism as a constraint on national power); Vicki C. Jack-
son, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31
RUTGERS L.J. 691, 699 (2000) [hereinafter Jackson, Seductions] ("There is no doubt we are in
the midst of a federalist revival."); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court:
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these areas, the Supreme Court has limited state power and ex-
panded national power in others.4
One of these expansions of national power has been in a reduc-
tion of the amount of deference the Court seems willing to grant to
state court interpretations of state law. The method of this expansion
lies in the Court's imposition of federal separation of powers princi-
ples on state governments. In three cases in recent years, the Su-
preme Court differentiated between the branches of government at
the state level to justify a refusal to defer to the state courts. It had
never done so before. By relying on a seemingly neutral federal prin-
ciple, without analyzing its applicability to the new context, the Court
hid the aggrandizement of power to itself.
The first case, with which we are all familiar, and in fact of which
we are probably weary, is Bush v. Gore. Here, the Supreme Court or-
dered an end to a recount of ballots cast in the 2000 presidential
election.6 Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion argued that the
Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state law should be re-
jected. Because the United States Constitution delegates the power
to design elections to the legislatures of the States, the Court had a
duty to ensure that the state judicial branch was faithful to the will of
the state legislative branch. He explained that, given this federal
constitutional duty, reviewing and rejecting the state court interpreta-
tion of state law "does not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather
a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures."8
A similar concurrence was issued by Justice Scalia in the 2006
term, in Kansas v. Marsh.9 In that case, the Kansas Supreme Court
had held that the State's death penalty statute violated the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, and the U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed.° Scalia emphasized in his concurrence why it was important
for the Supreme Court not to let states overenforce federal constitu-
tional principles:
A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 570-71 (2003) (noting the dominance of consti-
tutional federalism as a theme of the second Rehnquist Court).
4 See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 659 (identifying a downward shift in the level of defer-
ence the Rehnquist Court gave elected branches of government); Ruth Colker &James J. Brud-
ney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80, 82-83 (2001) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court was
not consistently in favor of States' rights); Merrill, supra note 3, at 571 (critiquing theories of
the Rehnquist Court that ignored evidence of the Court's favoring national power in certain
circumstances).
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
Id. at 105-11 (holding that any recount attempting to meet the statutory deadline would
be unconstitutional).
7 Id. at 112-13 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
8 Id. at 115.
9 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2529-39 (2006) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
10 Id. at 2520-21, 2529.
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When state courts erroneously invalidate actions taken by the people of a
State (through initiative or through normal operation of the political
branches of their state government) on state-law grounds, it is generally
none of our business; and our displacing of those judgments would in-
deed be an intrusion upon state autonomy. But when state courts erro-
neously invalidate such actions because they believe federal law requires
it-and especially when they do so because they believe the Federal Consti-
tution requires it-review by this Court, far from undermining state auton-
omy, is the only possible way to vindicate it. When a federal constitutional
interdict against the duly expressed will of the people of a State is erro-
neously pronounced by a State's highest court, no authority in the
State-not even a referendum agreed to by all its citizens-can undo the
error. Thus, a general presumption against such review displays not re-
spect for the States, but a complacent willingness to allow judges to strip
the people of the power to govern themselves. When we correct a state
court's federal errors, we return power to the State, and to its people. 11
After Bush v. Gore, a flurry of scholarly contributions debated the
propriety of not deferring to the state court's interpretation of state
law, but none addressed the Court's construction of state separation
of powers in a systematic way.12
That flurry over the concurrence may have been much ado about
nothing, except that, in addition to the concerns appearing in an-
other concurrence, those same sentiments provided a foundation for
a unanimous court, deciding a relatively mundane equal protection
challenge to a state tax, to reject an interpretation of state law by a
state supreme court.13 The Court stated that "the Constitution grants
I Id. at 2530-31 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
2 Two scholars have raised the issue prior to this article. Louise Weinberg discussed the
issue in these terms, but devoted only a small portion of her article to the issue. Louise
Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609,
625-27 (2002). Instead, Professor Weinberg focused primarily on the fact that the Court de-
cided the outcome of the election, arguing that action was an unconstitutional aggrandizement
of power. See id. at 620 ("[T]he Court's action was obviously incompatible ... with the Consti-
tution of the United States."). Additionally, Mark Tushnet wrote that Vicki Jackson suggested
this separation-of-powers issue in an e-mail to him in 2001. Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v.
Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90 GEO. L.J. 113, 124 n.64 (2001).
'3 Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108 (2003). At issue were the taxes
on the proceeds of slot machines at the State's racetracks and riverboats; these proceeds were
the primary source of revenue for both types of gaming establishments. Racing Ass'n of Cent.
Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 555, 557, 559 (Iowa 2002), rev'd, 539 U.S. 103 (2003). At the
State's horse and dog racetracks, slot machine proceeds were taxed at a maximum of 36%,
while at the State's riverboats, they were taxed at a maximum of 20%. IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 99F.4A(6), .11 (West 2004). Finding that the proceeds were similarly situated, the Iowa Su-
preme Court held that the higher taxation on racetrack proceeds was irrational because it frus-
trated the purpose of the act creating it. Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d at 561. The legislative purpose
found by the Iowa Supreme Court was to provide another source of revenue to the State's rac-
ing industry in an effort to make an unprofitable venture profitable again. Id. at 560. Taxing
the proceeds at the racetracks at a much higher rate than that of the riverboats threatened that
profitability, defeating the purpose of the act. Id. at 560-62. Before the Iowa Supreme Court,
the State argued that the purpose of the act was to encourage economic growth and promote
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legislators, not courts, broad authority (within the bounds of rational-
ity) to decide whom they wish to help with their... laws and how
much help those laws ought to provide."' 4 In other words, rather
than defer to the state court, the Supreme Court deferred to the state
legislature. To date, this case, Fitzgerald v. Racing Association, has not
even been a blip on the radar screen of federalism scholars.
Fitzgerald is representative of the cases federal courts routinely en-
counter where they are asked to consider an issue of state law. That a
state court had already analyzed the law at issue does not make this
case much more unusual. In every one of those cases, federal courts
must decide whether to defer to the state-court analysis and, if so, by
how much. Federal courts will often defer, but many times they have
not done so, and they rarely explain the reasons for the departures
they make. This Article explores the reasoning behind the courts'
decisions about deference and endeavors to provide some guidance
for when federal courts should defer to state-court pronouncements
of state law.
More specifically, Part II of this Article illustrates the lines of au-
thority on deference for different types of state statutory questions.
Part III then suggests the principles that underlie this distinction, and
Part IV proposes guidelines for federal courts to use in analyzing
these problems.
I submit that when federal courts defer to a particular branch of
state government at the expense of another branch, they infringe on
State sovereignty. The power of federal courts to review acts of Con-
gress is a constitutional power. Similarly, the power of state courts to
review acts of state legislatures is a matter of state constitutional
power. Where the Federal Constitution explicitly grants state legisla-
tures particular powers, or where the state court's actions seem de-
signed to evade judicial review or frustrate a federal right, federal
courts are on relatively solid ground in not deferring to state courts.
Conversely, where the Federal Constitution treats the States as unitary
entities, and where there is no indication that state courts are work-
ing to undermine an important federal interest, federal courts have
little justification to exercise independent review of state law. By not
agriculture. Id. at 560. The court found that even if this were the purpose of the act, this pur-
pose, too, was frustrated by the higher tax rate on racetracks. Id. at 561.
On appeal, the racetracks argued that, when the Iowa Supreme Court determined what the
purpose of the act was, the court was interpreting Iowa law and its interpretation deserved the
deference that is almost always accorded state supreme court declarations of state law. Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 26, Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. 103 (No. 02-695). In other words, the inter-
pretation of the Iowa Supreme Court was binding on the United States Supreme Court. See
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 "all.) 590, 632-33 (1874) (holding that state courts
are the final interpreters of state law, and the Supreme Court is limited to reviewing only ques-
tions of federal law).
14 Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at 108.
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deferring, federal courts would essentially dictate what state constitu-
tional law should be. That result could nullify the power of the peo-
ple within the States to define their government and to define their
individual rights in a way more generous than that of the Federal
Constitution.
II. FEDERAL COURT APPROACHES TO STATE LAW
The Framers of our Constitution are thought to have created our
federal system of government to diffuse power, in order to guarantee
the maximum amount of individual freedom." The courts tend to
treat our system of federalism as dual, creating two judicial tracks in
which judges have competence over distinct subjects 6 Federal courts
are considered to have greater competence over federal law, and
state courts greater competence over state law.' 7 In other words, this
notion of dual sovereignty suggests a particular division of labor for
legal issues. Federal claims and federal issues should be heard by
federal courts, and state claims and state issues should be heard by
state courts.
Unfortunately, the world does not divide up quite so nicely, and
there is significant overlap between state and federal issues. For ex-
ample, state courts are often called upon to decide issues of federal
law.'8 State court competence over federal law is not entirely surpris-
15 See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 4, 25 (1995) ("That
the political structure adopted in the Constitution was designed simultaneously to preserve in-
dividual liberty and to avoid tyranny should come as no surprise to anyone reasonably well
schooled in the theory of American government."); Robert A. Schapiro, lntejurisdictional En-
forcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2005) ("One of the
key purposes of federalism is to offer enhanced protection for individual rights.").
See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246,
294 (2005) (describing and critiquing the theoretical model of dual federalism and its per-
petuation by courts).
17 See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERALJURISDICTION: TENSION IN THE ALLOCATION OFJUDICIAL
POWER 2-3 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that federal courts are experts on national law and state
courts are final interpreters of the law of their respective jurisdictions); Barry Friedman, Under
the Law of FederalJurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1211, 1236-41 (2004) (discussing how a sovereign's own courts should decide questions involv-
ing that sovereign's laws); Schapiro, supra note 15, at 1409; see also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts
and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981) (describing the rhe-
torical tradition that holds federal judges more competent to adjudicate federal matters); Philip
B. Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doc-
trine, Address Before the Conference of Chief Justices, 24 F.R.D. 481, 487 (1960) ("I start with
the principle that the federal courts are the primary experts on national law just as the State
courts are the final expositors of the laws of their respective jurisdictions.").
8 This role has always been part of the fabric of the federal judicial system, and the Madi-
sonian Compromise, which gave Congress the option to create lower federal courts, reflects
this. MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE &JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY
OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 29-31 (1999). The debate at the time centered on whether the crea-
tion of lower federal courts would be necessary to handle the broad caseload of federal cases or
would instead infringe on the role of States in deciding federal issues. Id. And, given how few
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ing because state courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Bound by
the Supremacy Clause, they not only are able to decide federal ques-
tions but also have a duty to do so.'9 Of course, that competence
notwithstanding, scholars disagree on whether state courts can ade-
quately protect federal interests. 0
As accepted as the notion of state court competence over federal
issues is, federal courts seem less competent to decide state law issues.
The mantra of modern federalism is that federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction and may only exercise the jurisdiction that the
Constitution or federal statutes grant. Thus, our first instinct might
be to say that federal courts should never decide issues of state law.
cases the United States Supreme Court hears, the States have become important guardians of
federal interests. See Friedman, supra note 17, at 1218-20 (noting that caseload constraints
make it impossible for the Supreme Court to review many of the state cases involving federal
questions); Robert R. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of
the Supreme Court's Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1304
(2005) ("[Tlhe Court has often reassured us that federal constitutional rights will be protected
because state judges would fairly consider them . . . ."); Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Moni-
toring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REv. 335, 350-53 (2002) (arguing that a
decrease in the review of state court cases by the Supreme Court "may make it difficult for fed-
eral and state lower court judges to resolve correctly or uniformly issues of federal law").
19 See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443 (1977) ("'[S] tate courts have the solemn
responsibility equally with federal courts' to safeguard constitutional rights .... " (quoting Stef-
fel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974))); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1946) (hold-
ing that state courts may not discriminate against federal claims, but rather, have a duty to hear
them); see also Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compro-
mise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 49-52, 161-70 (analyzing state-court obligations not to discriminate
against federal claims); cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999) (holding that this duty is
simply not to discriminate between state and federal claims, but that the States are not required
to hear federal claims if they do not entertain similar state claims).
20 Compare Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977) ("[T]he
only judicial forums.. . capable of enforcing countermajoriarian checks in a sustained, effec-
tive manner are the federal courts[,] and .... to the extent that constitutional cases can be
shifted from federal to state trial courts, the capacity of individuals to mount successful chal-
lenges to collective decisions will be substantially diminished.") with Bator, supra note 17, at 637
("[S]tate courts will and should continue to play a substantial role in the elaboration of federal
constitutional principles."), Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593,
599 (1991) ("[T]he differences between federal and state courts do not necessarily translate
into decisions that are more protective of individual liberties."), Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Re-
considered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 236-37 (1988)
("[L]itigants with federal constitutional claims should generally be able to choose the forum,
federal or state, in which to resolve their disputes."), and Michael E. Solimine & James L.
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity,
10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214-15 (1983) ("[Sltate courts are no more 'hostile' to the vin-
dication of federal rights than are their federal counterparts, and ... the opportunity for review
by state appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court significantly mitigates concern
over the institutional competence of state trial courts.").
21 See Schapiro, supra note 15, at 1426-28 (postulating that only state courts have the author-
ity to dictate state law by interpreting it).
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That approach, however, is not required by the text or structure
of the Constitution.2 The Constitution extends the judicial power of
the United States to "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties [, and] ... to
Controversies" between certain parties. 3 Moreover, the appellate
power of the Supreme Court extends "both as to Law and Fact., 24 By
empowering the judicial branch to decide all cases and particular
controversies, and by defining the appellate power as allowing de
novo review, the Constitution gives the judicial branch the power to
decide every issue, whether of fact or of law, whether state or federal,
as lon-g as that issue is contained in a case or controversy that would
fall within Article III's limits. 2 5 Thus, under the Constitution's terms,
federal courts likely have the power not only to consider issues of
state law, but also to decide them without deferring to state-court
constructions of that law.26
22 Many scholars have described the way that the federal and state governments actually
work together as "cooperative" federalism, which is not really a normative theory, but simply a
description of voluntary activity. E.g., Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION
AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUrITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 65,
80-83 (Daphne A. Kenyon &John Kincaid eds., 1991); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Econ-
omy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96
MICii. L. REV. 813, 815-16 (1998). John Kincaid has argued that in the late 1970s cooperative
federalism was replaced by coercive federalism when the federal government began using more
coercive regulatory tools, such as preempting state authority and presenting the states with un-
finded mandates. John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 139, 148-49 (1990).
23 U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
24 Id.
25 This is not to say that there are no constitutional limits on the review of facts found at the
trial-court level. The Seventh Amendment explicitly limits the facts a federal appellate court
can review, and the Due Process Clause may also provide some limit. See Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233-34 (1985) (noting the Seventh Amend-
ment's prohibition against reexamining facts tried by ajury). Additionally, the doctrine of ade-
quate and independent state grounds, which provides that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction
over a case that presents a federal question if the judgment could be wholly supported on the
outcome of a state-law issue, may have constitutional foundations. The Supreme Court's rever-
sal of the judgment would have no effect on the result, since the state court could issue the
same judgment on state-law grounds. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945). The Supreme
Court's decision would be an advisory opinion. Id.; see also Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and
the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1053 (1999) (arguing that
the adequate-and-independent-state-law-grounds doctrine is a part of Article IlI's standing re-
quirement). It is difficult to see, though, how what happened in Fitzgerald v. Racing Association,
where the State did just that on remand, would not be an advisory opinion in the same way. But
see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 n.4, 1039-40 (1983) (detailing the circumstances in
which the Court will take jurisdiction, even though the judgment could be sustained on state
grounds, namely, where those grounds are not clearly the actual grounds relied on, not truly
adequate, or not truly independent).
2b See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in
Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1967 (2003) ("[T]he Court's historical practice
provides support for the existence of an ancillary authority to exercise independent judgment
over state-law determinations in federal cases."); Monaghan, supra note 25, at 272-73 (arguing
that the Supreme Court can use its discretion to review the fact-finding and law application of
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Not only does the text of the Constitution allow federal courts a
broad reach to decide state-law issues, the structure of the Constitu-
tion also demonstrates that state and federal governance overlap sig-
nificantly. The federal government and the States share competence
to legislate in many areas. While some categories are truly reserved
to the States, like a general police power, and some are granted ex-
clusively to the federal government, like the power to grant patents,
these discrete categories grow ever fewer as our society changes and
more conduct transcends State boundaries.
Because of the overlap of federal and state law, federal courts en-
counter state-law questions in a number of ways.27 The most obvious
situation is when the federal court is sitting in diversity.2 s In other
situations, federal courts exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state-law claims that arise from the same nucleus of operative fact as a
claim over which federal courts would have jurisdiction.
In addition to these situations in which the state-law issues make
up discrete causes of action, questions of federal law are often inter-
twined with questions of state law. For example, a federal court may
consider a federal question to which federal common law applies,
and the content of that federal common law may be state law. °
Other examples of intertwined issues include situations when the
state-law question is an essential step in the analysis of federal law,
such as when the court must decide whether the Federal Constitution
state courts). But see Friedman, supra note 17, at 1237-46 (noting the sovereignty interests that
States have in state courts interpreting and enforcing their laws and the lack of interest federal
courts have in interpreting and enforcing state laws); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The
Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REx,. 1, 2-3 (1990) (arguing that
"rigid readings of the text [of Article III] fail to account for changing conceptions of the role of
federal courts").
27 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337-47, 358-59 (1816) (Story, J.)
(considering the federal courts' power under Article III to review the judgments of state courts
and to examine issues of state law); see also Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1963) (per cu-
riam) (requiring that, on habeas review of state criminal proceedings, federal courts defer to
state-court findings of fact unless they "are not 'fairly supported by the record"' (quoting Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2254, 62 Stat. 869, 967, repealed by Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e) (2000)))).
The Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over "Controversies... between Citi-
zens of different States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Congress gave that jurisdiction to the lower
federal courts as well. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000). When federal jurisdiction is based on diversity, there is no sup-
plemental jurisdiction over parties that would destroy that diversity. Id. § 1367(b). However,
only one party needs to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction,
so there will be supplemental jurisdiction over diverse parties that do not satisfy the amount-in-
controversy requirement as long as one party does satisfy it. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005).
E.g., Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) (involving the
time bar of a claim brought in the district courts of two different states); United States v. Kim-
bell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 739-40 (1979) (involving the prioritization of public and private liens
on property).
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protects a right created by state law3' or when a federal statute confers
a benefit or puts a burden on a class of people defined by state law."
A third category of these state-law-antecedent situations occurs when
federal courts evaluate the constitutionality of state laws.
The analysis that follows will refer to state law as if it were a single,
concrete concept. This is an oversimplification used to clarify a very
murky area. In fact, state law issues may come to federal courts in a
number of ways. State law may be contained in a statute never inter-
preted by any state court, or it may be contained in a statute that a
state court interpreted at some point in an unrelated, prior proceed-
ings. Conversely, the law may have been made entirely through state
common law. Finally, the issue may come to the Supreme Court by
direct review, and to the lower courts on certain limited kinds of col-
lateral review, as a direct interpretation of the state law at issue by a
state court applying that law to the exact factual context the federal
court faces. The source and nature of the state law will make a dif-
ference in how federal courts should interpret and apply that law.
This Article also discusses the state courts' prior actions as if they
were uniform, and that too is an oversimplification. For purposes of
this discussion, state-law determinations could range from pure ques-
tions of law, like what law applies, to "mixed" questions of law and
fact, or the application of the law to the facts 3  Both categories of
31 This describes, generally, procedural due process cases. The Constitution prohibits the
government from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (applying to the federal government); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (applying to
the States). The first step in a procedural due process case is, generally, to decide whether
there is a property or liberty interest that the law protects, and usually that interest is created by
state law. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
32 A well-known example is the Internal Revenue Code, which determines taxable income
on the basis of whether an individual is married but does not define how a person becomes
married. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); cf id. § 7703 (providing rules that govern when
in time a person is considered married, if that person has had a change in marital status; certain
married people living apart will not be considered married under the statutory definition). The
Federal Defense of Marriage Act provides another limit on the definition of marriage, provid-
ing that, for federal purposes, marriage is any "legal union between one man and one woman,"
but not defining what a legal union is. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
A similar issue is present when state law incorporates a federal-law issue, such as when state
tort law provides that violation of a federal regulation constitutes negligence per se, or when a
state tax code defines taxable income as the income defined as taxable by the Internal Revenue
Code. See Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 & n.14 (1986) (affirming in
dicta that the Supreme Court would have appellate jurisdiction over the federal question posed
in the former example, but holding that normally the issue would not present a federal ques-
tion before the lower federal courts as their statutory "arising under" jurisdiction has been in-
terpreted (quoting Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1934))).
. This Article does not touch on the amount of deference to be given to lower court find-
ings of fact. For a discussion of that issue, see Monaghan, supra note 25, at 236-38. Although
some courts and scholars assert that the different types of questions are discrete, they are more
properly viewed as being on a continuum. Id. at 233. Professors Allen and Pardo argue that
there is no defensible distinction between these types of questions and that questions of law are
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decisions may be reviewed de novo, but the more fact-intensive the
question, the more the courts may choose to grant some deference to
34
the lower courts.
A. Rules Providing Deference to State-Court Determinations
The propriety of federal courts considering state law has been ad-
dressed in several different situations, with fairly consistent results. In
1875, in the context of review of state court decisions, the Supreme
Court examined whether to review issues of state law in state high-
court cases when those state-law issues were distinct from the federal-
law issues. The Court determined that, under the jurisdictional stat-
utes, it could review all of the federal issues, but that the holdings of
the state court on issues of state law could not be reviewed.3 6 This
principle lies beneath the rule that the Supreme Court will not exer-
cise jurisdiction over a case in which a federal issue is present, even if
that issue was wrongly decided by the state court, if the judgment in
the case rests on "adequate and independent state grounds."
Similar to the rules developed for Supreme Court review of state
court decisions, federal courts encountering state issues must often
defer to state-court declarations of law. By statute, federal courts sit-
ting in diversity must follow state constitutional, statutory, and com-
mon law. 3  Thus, when the State's highest court has declared what
simply different types of fact questions. RonaldJ. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-
Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1769 (2003).
." Compare Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-26 (2000) (applying de novo review to a
determination of reasonable suspicion), Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1999) (opinion
of Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, _U.) (stating that fact-intensive issues of
constitutional law require de novo review), and Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697
(1996) (using de novo review because law "acquire [s] content only through application"), with
Lilly, 527 U.S. at 148 (5-4 decision) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (arguing that the question's fact-
intensive nature warranted deference), Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
for deference), and Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983) (de-
ferring to application of law to the facts on whether corporate activities constituted a unitary
business). But see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (hold-
ing that in First Amendment cases the Court must exercise de novo review of the law and facts).
35 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 614-15 (1875); see also Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392 (1798) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide whether
state statutes are valid under state constitutional law).
Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 632-33. This principle is so firmly established that, in Ring
v. Arizona, the Supreme Court deferred to an Arizona Supreme Court's refusal to follow the
U.S. Supreme Court's prior interpretation of an Arizona death penalty statute. 536 U.S. 584,
603 (2002). However, some scholars have argued that Congress did intend to give the Supreme
Court the power to review holdings in state court decisions because, after the Civil War, Con-
gress fundamentally distrusted the state courts. Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Proce-
dural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent
State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1291, 1319-20 (1986).
37 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-80 (1938) (interpreting the Rules of Decision
Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000))). The
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the law is, federal courts must follow that determination when decid-
ing diversity cases.
Similar to the adequate-and-independent-state-grounds threshold
for Supreme Court review of state court decisions, lower federal
courts may abstain entirely from considering cases in certain circum-
stances when state law is unclear.3 9 For the court to abstain in consti-
tutional cases, the state law must be substantially uncertain, and there
must be a reasonable possibility that the state court's clarification will
resolve the issue so that the court need not reach the constitutional
issue.40 In diversity cases, the state-law issue must be unclear and the
case must involve some important state interest that is Tart of the
State's unique power as sovereign, like eminent domain. Similarly,
in federal-question cases in which the issue is regulated by a complex
state administrative process designed to treat uniformly an essentially
local problem, federal courts may defer to the state process rather
than issue injunctive relief
42
Short of abstention, special rules of construction have been devel-
oped that embody deference to the states for cases in which federal
courts must interpret state laws that have been challenged as violating
holding in Erie rested, in part, on perceived constitutional limitations. SeeJohn Hart Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 703 (1974) ("[N]othing in the Constitution pro-
vided the central government with a general lawmaking authority of the sort the Court had
been exercising .... "); PaulJ. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie: The Thread, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1682, 1683 (1974) ("That Congress may have constitutional power to make federal law
displacing state substantive policy does not imply an equal range of power for federal judges.").
Some scholars have cast doubt on these principles as constitutionally required. ERWIN
CIEMER1NSKY, FEDERALJURISDICrION 326 (5th ed. 2007) ("The constitutional basis for the Erie
decision has confounded scholars." (citing Ely, supra; StewartJay, Oigins of Federal Common Law
(pt. 2), 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1985); and Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the
Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977))).
See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1959) (abstaining to
allow the state court to decide an unclear issue of state law of great local importance); Ala. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 345, 349-50 (1951) (deferring to "state court review of
an administrative scheme based on predominantly local factors"); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315, 332 (1943) (deferring to the state court regarding a complex state regulatory
scheme); R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-501 (1941) (abstaining to allow a
state court to determine a state-law issue that would be dispositive to a constitutional claim).
See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973) (stating that abstention is appropriate
"where the challenged state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary that
would avoid or modify the necessity of reaching a federal constitutional question"); Baggett v.
BtIllitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-78 & n.11 (1959) (declining abstention where the state statutory ques-
tion could not dispose of the federal constitutional issue).
41 Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28; see also Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185,
191-96 (1959) (holding that abstention was not appropriate where there were no "exceptional
circumstances" or "important countervailing interest").
42 SeeQuackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728-30 (1996) (holding that abstention
on administrative-process and local-problem grounds is only appropriate in cases of discretion-
ary relief); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989)
(limiting abstention to situations that would substantially interfere with administration of an
essentially local program).
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the Federal Constitution.43 Statutes, even those enacted by states, are
presumed to be constitutional, and a challenger bears the burden of
demonstrating that a statute violates the Constitution.44  Where the
challenge is that the law is unconstitutionally vague, it must be vague
in all of its applications, not merely unclear in some instances.4 5 And
where a statute might seem on its face to violate the Constitution, if
the state court has given the statute a narrower construction that
would be constitutional, that construction will be upheld..
4"
B. Rules Providing Less Deference to State Courts
Federal courts will not always defer to state-court determinations,
however. Even in the diversity context, federal courts have some
flexibility to interpret state law. If a State's highest court has not spo-
ken on the issue, federal courts are not required to certify a question
to that court. Nor do federal courts have to defer to the State's ap-
pellate courts, unless federal courts are convinced that the state su-
preme court would agree. In other words, federal courts are allowed
to predict how the state supreme court would decide the issue.47
Additionally, there are many situations in the state-law-antecedent
cases where federal courts will interpret what state law means, even if
the federal court also gives some amount deference to a state-court
interpretation. State law is antecedent to a federal issue when the
"existence, application or implementation of a federal right turns on
43 These ideologically neutral rules of construction have been called "quasi-constitutional
law," and can be used by the Court in a very sophisticated way to promote a number of values,
including ideological ones, through its decision making. See generally William N. Eskridge,Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
44 Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 198 (2001) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919,944 (1983)).
45 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 n.50 (1972) (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965)).
46 Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 452-53 (2005) (per curiam) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 654 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)). Not
exactly a rule of construction is the related doctrine of constitutional avoidance. It is an ap-
proach that is less deferential to the States than abstention, but is similar. A federal court can
decide a case based on a pendent state-law claim if doing so avoids the case's constitutional is-
sue; it need not refer to the State for decision. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S.
175, 192-93 (1909). This approach still affords the State significant deference by not calling
the state law into constitutional question, and it avoids some of the problems posed by absten-
tion, such as delay and increased cost.
47 CHARLES WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 396 (6th ed. 2002). Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the findings of lower federal courts
regarding the law of a State within their jurisdiction. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524
U.S. 156, 167 (1998) ("[There is a] presumption of deference given the views of a federal court
as to the law of a State within its jurisdiction."). Deference is not warranted, however, if State
expertise would not be warranted in interpreting the state law. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gon-
zales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005) (overturning lower court's interpretation of state law where it
"did not draw upon a deep well of state-specific expertise").
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the resolution of a logically antecedent issue of state law. 4 8 When
the federal right depends in this way on an issue of state law, federal
courts have the ability and the duty to decide what impact the state
law will have on the federal law.40 That impact is actually a federal
question, and not really interpretation of state law at all, even though
the federal-court analysis may look as if the federal court is interpret-
ing the state law. 50 Moreover, even in a state-law-antecedent case in
which the state court construction of the issue would resolve the mat-
ter and preclude consideration of the federal question, the federal
court may still need to review the state law to some extent to ensure,
at the least, that the law is not being construed to impair federal in-
terests.5' As a practical matter, the Supreme Court will often inter-
pret state law, rather than remand the matter to the State's highest
court for interpretation, when it must determine whether a right un-
der a state statute was unconstitutionally denied 52 or when the state
statute itself is unconstitutional.
53
When a state court has spoken on the issue, the Supreme Court
usually looks only far enough into the issue of state law to see
whether the decision of the state court "rests upon a fair or substan-
tial basis .... [I]f there is no evasion of the constitutional issue, and
the nonfederal ground of decision has fair support, [the] Court will
not.., substitute its own view of what should be deemed the better
rule. .. ,54 This fair-support rule applies generally to state-law-
antecedent issues.
However, the Supreme Court does not always follow the fair-
support rule. For example, in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand the is-
sue before the Court was whether a teacher had a vested contract
right that could not be impaired under the Constitution's Contract
48 Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and
Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1977).
49 Monaghan, supra note 26, at 1925-26, 1935-47.
See id. (analyzing the issue primarily in the context of constitutional cases, and referring to
this as "characterization" of the issue for federal-law purposes).
51 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WIECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 498 (5th ed. 2003); See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court
Review of State-Court State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REv. 80, 83-85 (2002) ("[T]he Court rou-
tinely claims the power to review a state-law decision that blocked a state court from considering
a federal claim .... ").
52 See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (affording the state court
some deference but ultimately deciding for itself whether a contract was made and, if so,
whether the State failed to honor the contract).
53 See Standard Oil Co. v.Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 482 (1942) ("Since validity of the state stat-
ute as constrned was drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitu-
tion, we think the case is properly here on appeal .... ").
Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1930) (cita-
tions omitted).
JOURNAL OF CONSTFI'UTIONAL LAW
Clause.5" The Indiana Supreme Court had ruled that she had no con-
tract under Indiana law, but the Supreme Court maintained the au-
thority to address the question directly:
On such a question, one primarily of state law, we accord respectful con-
sideration and great weight to the views of the State's highest court but,
in order that the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter,
we are bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made, what
are its terms and conditions, and whether the State has, by later legisla-
tion, impaired its obligation. This involves an appraisal of the statutes of
56the State and the decisions of its courts.
The Supreme Court determined that, contrary to the Indiana Su-
preme Court's finding, the Indiana statutory scheme and the State's
actions under it created a contract between the teacher and the State
that was protected under the Federal Constitution's Contract
Clause.57
Even though the Supreme Court found no evasion of the constitu-
tional issue, the Court did not evaluate whether the state court's in-
terpretation of state law had fair support. 5s Thus, federal supremacy
may sometimes provide a basis for federal courts to deviate from the
normal rules of deference.
C. Unifying the Two Approaches
This review of deference rules reveals that the amount of defer-
ence that federal courts afford the states ranges from total abstention
from even considering a case to de novo review of state law. The
rules that have emerged are pragmatic and balance State autonomy
5 303 U.S. 95, 96-99 (1938). For the Constitution's Contract Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 10.
Brand, 303 U.S. at 100 (citation omitted).
57 Id. at 105, 108-09. One possible interpretation of the holding is that, rather than decid-
ing the issue as a matter of state law, the Court was deciding the federal effect of the state laws,
an issue of federal law, not state law. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187
(1992) ("The question whether a contract was made is a federal question for purposes of Con-
tract Clause analysis, and 'whether it turns on issues of general or purely local law, we cannot
surrender the duty to exercise our own judgment.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Appleby v. City
of N.Y., 271 U.S. 364, 380 (1926))). Professors Monaghan and Fallon argue that the Due Proc-
ess Clause has some core conception of liberty and property, defined as matters of federal law,
that state law must satisfy, but state law rarely fails to satisfy those thresholds. Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 309, 327-29 (1993); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of"Liberty"and "Property, "62 CORNELL L. REv.
405, 440 (1977); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-86 (1995) (holding that state law
mandating certain procedures to follow before a prison inmate could be disciplined did not by
itself create a liberty interest; only a sentence that "imposes atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" would impair an inmate's limited
liberty interest).
58 The Court may have implicitly made this fair-support analysis by considering prior rulings
by the Indiana Supreme Court. Brand, 303 U.S. at 107.
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against federal interests. 59 Essentially, the traditional rule has embod-
ied a dualist federal approach: federal courts review issues of federal
law, and state high court determinations are final on issues of state
law. 6 While this is generally true, federal courts are less likely to de-
fer or affirmatively ask the State to interpret a state law when faced
with a state-law-antecedent situation.
This description of the federal-court approach to state-law issues
demonstrates that, in practice, the decisions of the federal court can
appear ad hoc and result-oriented. And when judicial federalism
cases are compared to other cases considering legislative federalism,
the federal courts' approach seems even more confusing. The Su-
preme Court appears to sometimes promote States' rights and to
sometimes expand national power, without consistency.
Most recently, the Rehnquist Court seemed to breathe new life
into state power by limiting Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment while also
strengthening the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. In United States
61 62v. Lopez in 1995 and United States v. Morrison in 2000, for the first
time since 1937, the Court struck down legislation as beyond Con-
gress's Commerce Clause power."3 In City of Boerne v. Flores,64 the
Court limited Congress's power to create legislative rights broader
than the constitutional rights the Fourteenth Amendment created.6 5
59 The rules could actually promote an ideological purpose of the Court, rather than a neu-
tral federalism purpose. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An
Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 745-46
(2000).
See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1875) (deeming state courts
the "appropriate tribunals" for state-law questions).
1 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (considering the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45), superseded by statute, Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125-26.
6 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (considering the Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Vio-
lence Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941-42 (1994)).63 ...
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2004). Since Morri-
son, the Court seems to have stepped back from this states'-rightsjurisprudence. In Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12-22 (2005), the Court upheld the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000), as valid Commerce Clause legislation that preempted California's
Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2007). The Com-
passionate Use Act had allowed individuals to grow small amounts of marijuana for their own
use when a doctor recommended the drug for serious medical conditions. Id. In its most re-
cent decision on the topic, the Court avoided the federalism issue in a case involving the execu-
tive branch's attempts to preempt the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 127.800-897 (West Supp. 1998), which allows doctors to prescribe drugs to help terminally
ill patients commit suicide, by finding that Congress failed to give the executive branch the
power to prohibit doctors from prescribing these drugs. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904,
916-22 (2006).
64 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
See id. at 519-20, 536 (holding that, while Congress has broad authority under the Consti-
tution to adopt legislation to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Court retains the right
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That decision was applied to broaden the reach of the Eleventh
Amendment, limiting, Congress's ability to subject the States to suits
for money damages. Using the Tenth Amendment, as well, the
Court during this time period limited federal power in New York v.
United States6 and Printz v. United States.68  The Court has also taken a
restrictive view of federal power in habeas corpus jurisdiction 69 and
70civil rights cases.
Currently, in all but the Tenth Amendment context, the Court
has issued subsequent decisions that elevate federal interests above
states rights. 7' Furthermore, at the same time that it issued the strong
to determine whether such legislation amounts to an abuse of authority under the Constitu-
tion).
For examples of cases in which the requirements were not met for private individuals to
recover money damages against the States, see Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). The Eleventh Amendment was strengthened in this way by Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), in which the Court held that Congress could abrogate state
sovereign immunity only under its Fourteenth Amendment powers. Id. at 57-60. Not only are
States immune from suit in federal court, but Congress cannot subject them to suit in their own
courts either. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730-54 (1999). For a thorough analysis of this
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see Marcia L. McCormick, Federalism Re-Constructed: The
Eleventh Amendment's Illogical Impact on Congress'Power, 37. IND. L. REV. 345 (2004).
As in the Commerce Clause context, the Court seems to be stepping back here as well. Four
cases in the last three years have upheld Congress's power. In Nevada Department of Human Re-
sources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), the Court held that Congress had the power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-54 (2000). In Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), the Court upheld Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (2000), as a valid abrogation of state sov-
ereign immunity, at least as far as it mandated access to courthouses and other functions of
government. Then, in two bankruptcy cases, Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S.
440 (2004), and Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006), the Court held
that Congress could subject the State to suit for in rem bankruptcy proceedings under its Arti-
cle I bankruptcy powers.
67 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992) (holding that Congress could not coerce State governments
into either accepting ownership of radioactive waste or implementing legislation dictated by
Congress).
521 U.S. 898, 925-33 (1997) (overturning Congress's mandate that local law enforcement
conduct background checks on applicants for gun permits as commandeering).
69 E.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318 (1995) (expressing concern that habeas filings
threatened the finality of state court judgments, implicating comity and federalism), superseded
by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101,
105, 106, 110 Star. 1214, 1217, 1220 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255 (2000)).
70 E.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 476-85 (1996) (holding that preclear-
ance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000), cannot be de-
nied simply because a jurisdiction's voting procedures violate section 2 of the Act, id. § 1973);
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (recognizing that, even though federal and state
courts may have concurrent jurisdiction over particular subject matter, there are circumstances
in which federalism and comity concerns dictate federal abstention). But see Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952, 1069 (1996) (54 decision) (Souter,J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality opinion for
going too far in limiting State discretion under the Voting Rights Act).
71 See supra notes 63, 66.
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states'-rights decisions described above, the Court also issued deci-
72sions that extend the national power in other areas.
Taken as a whole, then, the Court's federalism decisions seem in-
consistent and ideologically based.73 The following section of this Ar-
ticle seeks to divine some nonideological guiding principles that fed-
eral courts can draw on to explain the level of deference they give to
States in state-law issues.
III. FEDERAL CONSIDERATION OF STATE-LEVEL INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETENCE
There is a spectrum of options available to federal courts encoun-
tering state-court determinations of state law. At one end of the spec-
trum, federal courts would abstain from hearing cases that involved
issues of state law, or they would consider the cases but not consider
the state-law issues at all, instead deferring entirely to any state de-
termination of what the law means or how it should be applied to
these facts. At the other end of the spectrum, federal courts would
review every issue of law or fact de novo, with no deference to any
prior holdings by state courts either in the case before the federal
court or in a prior, unrelated proceeding that would be precedential
in state court.
While all of the cases fall along this continuum, federal courts
rarely explain what reasoning underlies their decisions whether to
defer. A great number of the variances from the usual rule of defer-
ence can be explained, however, by notions of institutional compe-
tency: federal courts are deferring to the State institution that they
perceive to be most competent to perform the task at issue or not de-
ferring where the particular State institution lacks special compe-
tency.
Federal-court discourse has long incorporated the concept of in-
stitutional competence, usually under the principle of separation of
72 E.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 112-16 (2000) (holding that state laws governing
design standards for oil tankers were preempted by federal law); Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575-88 (1997) (striking down a state tax incentive on
Dormant Commerce Clause grounds); Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374, 387-91 (1992) (finding a
state law regarding airline-fare advertising preempted by federal statute). There have been a
large number of preemption cases in recent years, some expanding the scope of federal power
and some not. For a full discussion of these preemption cases in a functional analysis, see Mi-
chael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assess-
ment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 43, 47 (2006), and Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1353, 1365-98 (2006).
73 See Cross & Tiller, supra note 59, at 757-62, 768 (examining the "significant ideological
component of federalism decisionmaking"); David Niven & Kenneth W. Miller, Federalism by
Convenience: The Supreme Court's Judicial Federalists on the Death Penalty and States' Rights Controver-
sies, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 567 (2005) (exploring the Court's "selective embrace of states' rights");
see also Jackson, Narratives, supra note 3, at 280 (arguing that the Court's record on protection of
State power from federal encroachment is suspect).
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powers. That notion has nearly always been articulated when federal
courts employ it in a horizontal fashion, that is, when determining
whether the federal judicial branch, Congress, or the President is
more properly suited for a particular task. Occasionally, though,
state-level institutional competence has been the explicit focus of
federal courts. Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Bush v.
Gore14 is the most famous, or infamous, example.
This Part analyzes the cases in which the Supreme Court has not
deferred to state-court interpretations of state law, with a particular
focus on those cases in which the Court has explicitly deferred to the
state legislative branch. As part of this analysis, I distinguish between
two kinds of state court decisions: interpretations of what a statute
means and discernment of what the purpose of a state law is. The
distinction has important implications.
In either context I submit that, because the Federal Constitution
rarely differentiates between the branches of state government, fed-
eral courts have little justification for doing so. Ultimately, deciding
which branch of state government should have primacy over any par-
ticular issue is a matter of state constitutional law. In other words,
just as federal judicial review is part of the federal courts' constitu-
tional power, the interpretation of state law is simply an exercise of
the state courts' state-constitutional power. As such, the determina-
tion of the proper balance of that power should be up to each State.
A. Independent Review in State Courts'Interpretations of the Meaning or
Content of State Law
In only a few cases has the Supreme Court admitted to engaging
in independent review of the meaning of state law and of rejecting
the state court's interpretation of that law, and each of those in-
stances was in service to the supremacy of an important and substan-
tive federal right or enumerated power. In Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's
Lessee, for example, the Supreme Court indepentendly reviewed Vir-
ginia law to determine the proper title to land because the state-law
issues were antecedent to deciding what rights the putative owner
had under federal treaties.76 State hostility to the role of the Supreme
Court and the supremacy of federal law at the time of the Fairfax case
may have made such rejection necessary. 76 Born out of similar resis-
74 For more information on Justice Rehnquist's concurrence, see supra notes 7-8 and ac-
companying text.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 618-28 (1813). The Court explained its reasoning for deciding
in this manner in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 357-58 (1816).
76 See Bush v Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140 (2000) (per curiam) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing how Fairfax "occurred amidst vociferous States' rights attacks on the Marshall Court" (citing
GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 61-62 (13th ed. 1997))).
This hostility was based, at least in part, on State hostility to British creditors after the Revoln-
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tance to federal authority, the Supreme Court's decisions in NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson77 and Boule v. City of Columbia 8 rejected
state-supreme-court deviations from prior state law when those devia-
tions themselves violated due process. 7 ' Even before State resistance
to federal enforcement of civil rights, in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v.
Brand, the Supreme Court rejected the Indiana Supreme Court's
construction of state law where that construction could have arguably
deprived a teacher of property without due process of law. 0
Conversely, in most instances in which a state court is interpreting
what a state statute means, federal courts will defer to that state
court's interpretation.8 ' But this is not always the case. The most
controversial example is Bush v. Gore, in which a majority of the Su-
preme Court ordered an end to a recount of ballots cast in the 2000
presidential election.2 The majority held that no constitutionally
permissible recount could be accomplished by a deadline that gave
the States a "safe-harbor," even though the Florida Supreme Court
was given no opportunity to determine whether the legislature in-
tended to meet this deadline in situations like the one presented."
Rather than remand to the Florida Supreme Court to order that the
recount proceed in a method consistent with Florida's election law,
the Supreme Court held that no constitutional method could com-
plete the recount in time to comply with what the Court interpreted
the election law to require. 
4
tionary War. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Inven-
tion of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1438-49 (discussing specific legal actions by States
to prevent British creditors from recovering debts after the Revolutionary War).
77357 U.S. 449 (1958).
78 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
7 Id. at 350, 362 ("We think it clear that the South Carolina Supreme Court, in applying its
new construction of the statute to affirm these convictions, has deprived petitioners of rights
guaranteed to them by the Due Process Clause."); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 455, 457-58 ("Novelty in
[state] procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for
by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their
federal constitutional rights.").
80 303 U.S. 95, 108-10 (1938). The Court may have based its decision on the fact that the
Indiana Supreme Court had changed its interpretation of state law in holding that Brand did
not have a contract. Id. at 107. Thus, Brand may be completely analogous to Martin, Bouie, and
Patterson. For a detailed discussion of Brand, see supra Part II.B.
81 SeeJohnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) ("Neither this Court nor any other fed-
eral tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one
rendered by the highest court of the state."); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992)
(holding the state court's interpretation of a local ordinance binding); United States v. Thirty-
Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (plurality opinion, in a part joined by five
justices) ("[W]e lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation."); see also Wiscon-
sin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 483 (1993) (contrasting interpretation of a state statute with con-
clusions about what effect the statute has).
82 531 U.S. 98, 105-11 (2000) (per curiam).
83 1d at 110-11.
84 Id. at I11.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence went further. In it he ar-
gued that the Florida Supreme Court misinterpreted Florida election
law when it ordered the recount and, thus, impermissibly thwarted
the will of the Florida Legislature.85 As a precursor to this conclusion,
the Chief Justice argued that the United States Supreme Court had a
duty under Article II of the United States Constitution, which assigns
the power to direct the appointment of electors to the legislatures of
the States, to ensure that the statejudicial branch was faithful to the
will of the state legislative branch." He explained that given this fed-
eral constitutional duty, the review and rejection of the state court in-
terpretation of state law "does not imply a disrespect for state courts
but rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state
legiSlatures."s7
Thus, where state courts are suspected of undermining the su-
premacy of the federal government as an institution, depriving an in-
dividual of a federal constitutional right, or otherwise violating an
express provision of the Constitution, federal courts will not defer to
those courts. 8
B. Independent Review in the Statutory-Purpose Context
Another, less-analyzed area is state-court declarations of the pur-
pose of legislation. The purpose of legislation or of other govern-
ment action is an important consideration in First, Fifth, and Four-
teenth Amendment constitutional analysis, as well as Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. In these contexts, the courts apply vary-
ing levels of scrutiny based on the type of legislation at issue and the
interest at stake. These levels of scrutiny embody varying levels of def-
erence to the States. Some types of restrictions and classifications are
simply not allowed. For example, in the Establishment Clause con-
text, the government may not impose a requirement or restriction on
individuals for a religious purpose.8 9 Other restrictions and classifica-
tions are given strict scrutiny: the law must be the least restrictive
means to achieve a compelling state interest.8 Still others receive in-
85 Id. at 116-22 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
86 Id. at 111-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
87 Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Laura S. Fitzgerald has argued that these should be the only times that federal courts
should fail to defer to state court interpretations of state law. Fitzgerald, supra note 51, at 89,
91-99.
89 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding that statutes related to re-
ligion must have a secular legislative purpose, have "principal or primary effect... that neither
advances nor inhibits religion," and "must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion"' (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970))).
90 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(holding that differential treatment on the basis of race can only be upheld where it is justified
by a "compelling governmental interest" and is "narrowly tailored" to meet that goal (quoting
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termediate scrutiny: the law must be substantially related to an im-
portant state interest."' The vast majority of legislation receives ra-
tional-basis review: the law must be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose.
For strict and intermediate scrutiny, the State bears the burden of
demonstrating that the purpose of the legislation is to promote the
right kind of governmental interest. 93 For rational-basis review, on
the other hand, the burden is on the challenger to demonstrate ei-
ther that there is no legitimate governmental interest or that there is
no rational relationship between the interest and the means chosen
94by the legislature. The legislature need not articulate that purpose,
and if it does not, the courts will evaluate whether any plausible le-S • 95
gitimate purpose could be behind the legislation. This test is not
completely boundless, however: the legislature must have been able
to reasonably consider the legislative facts before it to be true.9' Still,
those facts need not actually be true; that legislative facts turn out to
be mistaken is not a reason to reject a purpose based on those facts.
9 7
The Supreme Court has stated that it affords deference to state
court declarations of purpose similar, if not quite at the same level, to
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984), and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980)
(plurality opinion), overruled on oier grounds by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1980))).
91 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that Virginia did not
show an important enough interest in maintaining its single-sex military academy).
92 See, e.g., Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) (applying rational-basis re-
view to Kentucky statutes that required different standards of evidence for involuntary com-
mitment based on mental retardation and mental illness). Justice O'Connor has suggested that
there should be an even lower threshold for invalidating state legislation under the Commerce
Clause than the standard used under the Due Process Clause because a federal court decision
on Commerce Clause grounds may be overcome more easily by the legislature. ASARCO, Inc.
v. Idaho St. Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 350 n.14 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
Richard A. Cordray &James T. Vradelis, Comment, The EmergingJurisprudence ofJustice O'Connor,
52 U. CHI. L. REv. 389, 419 (1985) (noting that Justice O'Connor's ASARCO footnote might
have far-reaching implications for federal court deference to state statutes that are suspect tin-
der the Due Process Clause).
93 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33 (stating that in intermediate scrutiny cases the State bears
the burden of showing an important governmental objective and that the means are substan-
tiallly related to that objective); Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (holding that, in the
strict scrutiny context, the State may not simply assert that the interest to be served is compel-
ling and the means narrowly tailored, but must provide strong evidence of it).
94 See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003) (explaining that the
burden is on the challenging party in such cases to "'negative every conceivable basis' that
might support different treatment" (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))).
95 See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (stating that rational-basis analysis "re-
quire[s] that a purpose may conceivably or 'may reasonably have been the purpose and policy'
of the relevant governmental decisionmaker" (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 522, 528-29 (1959))).
96 Id. at 11 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)).
97 Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 464 ("Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably
supporting classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by ten-
dering evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken.").
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that which it affords interpretations of meaning." For example, in
United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Court stated, "[w]e
must, of course, accept the state court's view of the purpose of its own
law... ."'K Similarly, in Allen v. Illinois, both the majority and the dis-
sent agreed that the state court was the authority on both the mean-
ing and purpose of state law.'00 In fact, the rules that the Supreme
Court has developed will sometimes lead to greater deference to find-
ings of purpose. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the
purpose of a state law is a question of fact... and that the parties may
present evidence on the subject. 0 2 Questions of fact are routinely af-
forded high levels of deference.
0 3
Despite these assertions, the Supreme Court has rejected state-
court findings of purpose in several cases. In the Establishment
Clause context, the Court has stated that, "[w] hile the Court is nor-
mally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is re-
quired that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a
98 This qualification was noted by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 383-84 (1997) (5-4 decision) (Breyer, J., dissenting), although it is not made explicit in the
cases that he cites.
99 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995).
too 478 U.S. 364, 367 (5-4 decision) (1986) (accepting the state court's interpretation of pur-
pose, but also analyzing the statute); accord id. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the
State is the final authority on both meaning and purpose, but disagreeing with the effect of the
statute).
to] See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) (treating the question of the
purpose of a government action, eminent domain, as a question of fact); Crawford v. Bd. of
Edtc., 458 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1982) (treating the question of legislative intent as one of fact).
Although the law at issue in Crawford was a proposition amending the California Constitution,
the Supreme Court did not indicate that the type of state law made a difference in the analysis.
It does not seem that a statute's purpose should be treated more like a question of law. Cer-
tainly state-court interpretations of the meaning of state constitutional provisions should be
given enormous deference: because those constitutions embody a particularly sovereign inter-
est, the state courts are uniquely situated to interpret that meaning, and federal courts are not
competent to second-guess the state courts, except in extremely rare circumstances. However,
the issue here is not one of meaning, but rather one of purpose, which is more like a historical
fact than is the slippery notion of group intent.
102 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) ("Where the existence
of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond
the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry"
(citing Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934))). It is not enough to provide
evidence that the legislature was mistaken, however:
[Parties challenging legislation] cannot prevail so long as "it is evident from all the con-
siderations presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice,
that the question is at least debatable." Where there was evidence before the legislature
reasonably supporting the classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the leg-
islation merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken.
Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 464 (alterations in Clover Lea]) (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 154).
This is not the type of proof at issue in Fitzgerald or Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997),
discussed infra notes 108-130 and accompanying text. Those cases concerned evidence of what
the legislature considered and intended, not of the validity of the facts before the legislature.
103 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (stating that "[flindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous").
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sham."'' 4 Because Establishment Clause cases warrant a very search-
ing review, this result seems analogous to those cases involving mean-
ing where the Court suspected state courts of evading Supreme Court
review.
In the context of rational-basis review as well, though, the Su-
preme Court has rejected state-court findings of purpose. In Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission, both the state statute
and the state constitution provided that property tax valuation be
based on a particular criterion. The Supreme Court rejected a
state-court finding that the legislature could have intended to allow
valuation based on a different and incompatible criterion.10
In these examples the Supreme Court rejected expansive state-
court interpretations of purpose meant to find state legislation le-
gitimate, but, in at least two recent cases, the Court has also rejected
the limiting interpretations of purpose state courts have used to strike
down legislation. In Kansas v. Hendricks,'0 7 a Kansas man challenged
the State's Sexually Violent Predator Act,0 8 arguing, among other
things, that it was a punitive statute that violated the federal constitu-
tional prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws.'It
The Supreme Court treated the question of whether the statute was
civil or criminal as a matter of law, and thus a question of statutory
construction." 0  The Court then looked at the placement of the stat-
ute in the Kansas codes and analyzed the statute's language and
structure."' The Court found that two things manifested the intent
of the legislature that the statute not be punitive, and therefore not
criminal: (1) the placement of the statute in the probate code; and
104 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
64 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)); see also Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that the secular-purpose requirement is meaningful because "our courts are capable of
distinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere one"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41
(1980) (per curiam) (holding that the avowed secular purpose of a statute would not blind the
Court when the statute had a plainly religious nature); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963) (holding that the implementation of a purportedly secular practice
made clear its religious nature).
105 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989).
106 Id. at 345; see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1992) (distinguishing another
unequal tax assessment on the basis that "Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts
precluded any plausible inference that the reason for the unequal assessment practice was to
achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme"). In another situation in which the Su-
preme Court defended its decision to construe purpose broadly, the Court distinguished a prior
case that had not construed purpose broadly. SeeAllied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 530 (1959) (distinguishing Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 572 (1949), by
stating, "[h]aving themselves specifically declared their purpose, the Ohio statutes left no room
to conceive of any other purpose for their existence").
107 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (5-4 decision).
108 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a21 (2005).
109 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360-61.
1o Id. at 361 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)).
I Id. at 361-67.
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(2) the statement within the statute that its purpose was to create a
civil commitment procedure. 1
2
Previously, the Kansas Supreme Court had held, despite these two
points, that the "overriding" purpose of the statute was punitive-to
segregate people subject to it from the public-and that any treat-
ment was "incidental, at best."13 The court held this in part because
the legislature had stated in its declaration of purpose that sexually
violent predators could not be treated under the existing civil com-
mitment statute, which provided for commitment of people with
mental illnesses, and because no effort had been made to treat any
offenders."14 Accordingly, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the
primary purpose of the statute was to incarcerate, not to provide
treatment. "t 5
The United States Supreme Court rejected this formulation, find-
ing that the statute could have more than one purpose, and noting
that the mere possibility that the Kansas legislature could have in-
tended for sexually violent predators to have treatment, in an ideal
situation, was enough to make this a civil statute."
6
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the statute contained
enough punitive aspects that its purpose was ambiguous. "7  Given
that ambiguity, Justice Breyer argued that the finding by the Kansas
Supreme Court, that the purpose of the statute was to incapacitate
and not to treat offenders, should be entitled to deference.""
Six years later, Justice Breyer delivered the unanimous opinion in
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa, refusing to defer to the Iowa
Supreme Court's finding of purpose."9 At issue in Fitzgerald was a tax
on the proceeds of slot machines at the State's racetracks and river-
boats; these proceeds were the primary source of revenue for both
types of gaming establishment. At the State's horse and dog race-
tracks, slot machine proceeds were taxed at a maximum of 36%,
while at the State's riverboats, they were taxed at a maximum of
112 Id. at 362.
1 In re Care & Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
14 Id. at 136. The state supreme court found it particularly troubling that the statute did not
even allow for treatment until after a sexually violent predator had served the original criminal
sentence. Id. (quoting Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 753 (W.D. Wash. 1995), rev'd en banc,
No. CV-94-00480C (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 1998), affd, 192 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1999), revd sub noma.
Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001)).
115 Id.
116 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367-69.
117 Id. at 379-81 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 384-85. Justice Breyer supported the finding of the Kansas Supreme Court by ana-
lyzing the statute and the record, which detailed the lack of effort made to treat Hendricks. Id.
at 385-95.
19 539 U.S. 103, 110 (2003).
10 Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 555, 557, 559 (Iowa 2002), rev'd, 539
U.S. 103 (2003).
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20%. 21 Finding that the proceeds were similarly situated, the Iowa
Supreme Court then found the scheme irrational because the tax
frustrated the purpose of the act creating it.122 The purpose found by
the Iowa Supreme Court was to promote the State's racing industry in
an effort to make an unprofitable venture profitable again. 23 Taxing
the proceeds at the racetracks at a rate so much higher than that of
the riverboats damaged their profitability, defeating the purpose of
the act. 1
24
The racetracks argued that when the state court determined the
purpose of the act, it was interpreting Iowa law, and that interpreta-
tion deserved the usual deference. 2  In other words, that interpreta-
tion was binding on the United States Supreme Court. 12  Here it
would mean that the Supreme Court was bound by the state-court
finding that the purpose of the statute at issue was to promote the
racing industry in Iowa. 127  With that threshold, it would follow that
the differential tax rate could not be rationally related to that pur-
pose.
The Supreme Court did not agree that it owed any deference to
the state court. Rather than accept the purpose the state court
found-the actual 28 purpose-the Supreme Court theorized multiple
potential legitimate State interests to which the differential tax could
be rationally related. Finding this rational relationship, the Court
upheld the tax under the Federal Constitution. 12' Tojustify its deci-
sion not to defer to the state court, the Supreme Court stated, "the
Constitution grants legislators, not courts, broad authority (within the
121 IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.4A(6), .11 (West 2004).
122 Fitzgerald. 648 N.W.2d at 561.
123 Id. at 560.
124 Id. at 560-62. Before the Iowa Supreme Court, the State argued that the purpose of the
act was to encourage economic growth and promote agriculture. Id. at 560. The court found
that, even if this were the purpose of the act, this purpose, too, was frustrated by the higher tax
rate on racetracks. Id. at 561.
125 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103
(2003) (No. 02-695).
126 See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 607-08 (1875) (holding that state
courts are the final interpreters of state law, with the United States Supreme Court limited to
reviewing only questions of federal law).
127 This was the stated purpose of the legislation. Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d at 560-61.
1I use this term here to highlight the approach of the Iowa Supreme Court and not neces-
sarily as an endorsement of the correctness of that court's holding.
129 Not to be outdone, the Iowa Supreme Court later struck down the tax under the Iowa
Constitution's Equal Protection provision, although it did so not by creating a separate test un-
der its constitution but through an "independent application" of the federal test. Racing Ass'n
of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Iowa 2004) (citing William J. Brennan,Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 500 (1977)). There is
no (federal) question that the Iowa court could apply the federal test and reach a result that the
United States Supreme Court had rejected, as long as the Iowa court's result rested on the Iowa
Constitution. See Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-
Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1499, 1501, 1514 (2005).
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bounds of rationality) to decide whom they wish to help with their tax
laws and how much help those laws ought to provide."'1 3 0 In other
words, rather than defer to the state court, the Supreme Court de-
ferred to the state legislature.
While this may seem analogous to Justice Rehnquist's concur-
rence in Bush v. Gore, which relied on the Constitution's delegation of
authority to the state legislative branch, one important ingredient is
missing. The Constitution does not expressly delegate the authority
to set state nonelectoral policy to the state legislative branch. That
power would be reserved to the State as a whole, as evidenced by the
Tenth Amendment, which makes no distinction between the
branches of state government. "'
Certainly, there may be other arguments that support the decision
to defer to a particular branch of state government in the purpose
context that are different from those in the meaning context. For
example, less deference may be warranted in the meaning context
because the difference between saying what a statute means and say-
ing why it exists suggests different institutional competencies. First,
saying what a statute means has a more powerful effect on individuals
than does stating the statute's purpose. The language and meaning
of the statute determine how that statute will operate on the world
and how it will curtail people's behavior or penalize them for that
behavior. Conversely, the purpose of legislation has very little direct
effect on the world, simply being the context in which the legislation
arose or an aspirational statement in the enacted legislation. That
context or aspirational statement can be used to help interpret the
meaning, or, given an improper purpose, it can make the statute in-
valid. However, the purpose, by itself, usually changes nothing in
practice. Because it is not the purpose of a statute that affects people,
but rather, the language or meaning of the statute that does so, de-
claring the purpose runs little risk of curtailing liberty or impairing
individual rights. Accordingly, as there is little reason to worry that
the legislature could oppress political minorities by its purpose alone,
this provides more of a reason to defer to the legislative branch in dis-
cerning purpose.
A second argument might be that, as the body that saw the need
for the legislation in the first place and created it, the legislature is in
a better position than are the courts to say why a particular statute is
needed. Thus, when the legislative act is presumptively valid-in
other words, when rational basis would apply under a constitutional
analysis-federal courts must defer to legislative possibilities rather
than to the holdings of courts. Conversely, where the judicial branch
has greater competence, such as when it interprets statutory mean-
13 Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at 108.
131 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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ing, giving effect to legislative intent and culling a single meaning
from multiple actors, the state judicial branch warrants deference.
Yet an equally persuasive argument could be made to treat pur-
pose interpretations with more, rather than less, deference. Federal
courts have expertise equal to that of state courts in interpreting
statutory language, and statutory interpretation is something that all
U.S. courts do. The search for meaning is a matter of construction of
language, clearly a question of law. However, discerning the purpose
or purposes of a law is not an act of construction, necessarily, and
may not be a question of law at all. Rather, discerning a purpose may
be more like finding a fact, a point the Supreme Court itself seems to
have accepted. 132
Whether it is a question of fact or an unusual question of law, state
courts, as part of the state government, are in a much better position
than are federal courts to understand why particular state legislation
was passed. State judges are more likely than are their federal coun-
terparts to know what the public debate over the issues was when the
legislation was created. State judges are also more likely to have some
insight into the state legislative process. Thus, state courts are in a
substantially better position to interpret the purpose of state legisla-
tion than are federal courts. 
133
C. Separation of Powers at the State Level
The lesson to be taken from all of these cases and modes of defer-
ence is that, where the Constitution affords leeway to the States, the
Court is likely to defer to the state legislative branch at the expense of
the state judiciary. This was implied by the majority in Hendricks, and
it was stated explicitly by the Court in Fitzgerald. Conversely, where
the Constitution limits State power, the Court is more likely to defer
to the interpretation of state law by state courts, unless there is a rea-
son to suspect the courts themselves of interpreting the state law in
order to mask a constitutional violation, or to deprive a party of due
process or equal protection.134
12 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) (treating the purpose of gov-
ernment action as a question of fact); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1982)
(treating the question of legislative intent of a constitutional proposition as one of fact).
133 On yet another side, the existence of the Fourteenth Amendment may suggest that States
cannot be trusted to tell the truth about what the purpose of some legislation is if that legisla-
tion impacts individual rights. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 71-74 (1993) (chronicling John Bingham's advocacy of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a means to enforce the Bill of Rights on the States that were disre-
garding the Constitution).
34 This was Justice Rehnquist's stated reason for deferring to the legislative branch in his
concurrence in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring). See also Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Func-
tion, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1900-01 (2001) (arguing that deference by federal courts to state
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But there is nothing in the Federal Constitution that warrants giv-
ing deference to the state legislative branch at the expense of the
state judicial branch in the majority of situations. The Federal Con-
stitution does not distinguish between state legislative and judicial
branches in describing the powers of each.13 5 The only constitutional
provision that limits the form the state government may take and the
distribution of powers within state government is the Guarantee
Clause, which provides, "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall pro-
tect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legisla-
ture, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened),
against domestic Violence." 13 6  Not only is the Constitution silent
about how States organize themselves within the bounds of a republi-
can form of government, 137 the Supreme Court has held that inter-
pretation of this Clause is a political question and notjusticiable.13
sovereignty in these cases is preferable because it leaves room for the state political process,
rather than federal judicial mandate and private suits, to remedy constitutional violations).
135 It is true, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence in Bush v. Gore, that Article
II, Section 1, delegates the power to determine how to elect presidential electors to the legisla-
ture of each State. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Article I, Section 4, which details how members of
Congress shall be elected, also refers to state legislatures but contrasts that power with Con-
gress's power, rather than the power of the state judicial branch. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. In
other places as well, the Constitution refers to different branches of state government, assuming
a structure somewhat similar to that of the federal government. See Michael C. Dorf, The Rele-
vance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 54-58 (1998)
(illustrating that the amendment procedure of Article V assumes a distinct state executive and
state legislature, and Article III assumes the existence of a state judicial branch). No section
suggests anything about the primacy of one branch over another. Moreover, there is no histori-
cal support for the significance of the language in Article II. See generally Hayward H. Smith,
History of the Article 11 Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 783-84
(2001) (concluding that the Framers of the Constitution never understood Article II to show
any particular solicitude towards state legislatures and that it has historically only been used in
make-weight arguments by politicians and courts).
1.6 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
137 This silence has not uniformly been interpreted to mean that the Constitution fails to
limit the exercise of power within state government. See Doff, supra note 135, at 58 (arguing
that the structure of the Federal Constitution implies that States should be organized in federal-
style separation of powers terms); Louis H. Pollak, Judicial Power and "The Politics of the People, "72
YALE L.J. 81, 88 (1962) (stating that the Federal Constitution "postulated the idea of" a tripartite
arrangement like that of the federal government).
138 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (determining that the question of
selection among competing state constitutions was valid for Congress to decide because "the
Constitution of the United States... has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed
the power in the hands of that department"). That the issue is a political question does not
leave the States entirely unregulated. The federal government must guarantee that a State's
form of government is republican, and, with federal courts out of the picture, it is up to Con-
gress to interpret what that means. Congress has not spoken on the subject.
Congress's power is probably not unbounded. The Court's opinion in Baker v. Carr may
have signaled that, in the right case, the Court will interpret issues touching on the Guarantee
Clause. 369 U.S. 186, 208-32 (1962); see also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and
State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70-78 (1988) (arguing that
the Guarantee Clause is ajudicially enforceable limit on federal power). The Supreme Court
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State constitutions, then, define how state governments are to be
formed and how various governmental powers should be exercised.
Because the institutions of state government are not identical to their
federal counterparts, the competence of those institutions is not
identical to that of their federal counterparts, and their powers need
not be separated in exactly the same way.'3 9  In fact, state constitu-
tions often give the judicial branch a much broader role in govern-
ment than that possessed by the federal judicial branch.140 For exam-
ple, state courts are not bound by Article III's justiciability doctrines
and, in fact, often share a policy-making role with the legislative
branch."' Conversely, in some instances, state courts have a narrower
role in government than does the federal judicial branch.' 42 Thus,
separation of powers operates quite differently at the state level, and
among the States, from how it operates at the federal level, '4 but it
remains an issue of state constitutional law.
has suggested, based on Merritt's argument, that the Clause might limit Congress's power to
regulate State activities and would, in those cases, be justiciable. See New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (citing Merritt's argument but not reaching the issue); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991) (same).
1.31 In fact, the Supreme Cotrt has noted that this issue is a matter of state constitutional law:
Whether the legislative, executive, andjtdicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether
distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons belonging to one de-
partment may, in respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain
to another department of government, is for the determination of the State.
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902); see also Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir.
1991) (holding that the States need not have the same separation of powers limitations as the
federal government); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3 (1998) (empha-
sizing that state constitutions, not the Federal Constitution, dictate the distribution of power
among the branches of state government );James A. Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism:
Power and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1744-46 (2003)
(listing the variety of ways state constitutions separate powers); Hershkoff, supra note 134, at
1884-86 (noting that States are not required to imitate the federal separation of powers system,
and observing the variety of systems developed across the States). Federal courts lack jurisdic-
tion to determine whether State actions violate the state's constitttion. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 392 (1798) ("[T]his court has no jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state
Legislature, contrary to the Constitution of such State, is void.").
Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1844-76 (illustrating the ways in which state courts "under-
take and discharge functions that are conventionally deemed beyond the Article III power");
Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vive la Diffhrence!, 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1273, 1273-79 (2005) (highlighting the extent to which "state courts take on responsi-
bilities federal courts decline").
141 See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1861-68 (discussing the extent to which state courts are
involved in matters that would be nonjusticiable as political questions for Article III courts).
42 See Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers and State Im-
plementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343,
1359-62, 1375-80 (2005) (discussing the strong nondelegation principle in state constitutional
law and other differences from federal organization of powers).
143 See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and Separation of Powers: A Venerable Doctrine in Var-
ied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1417, 1458-59 (1998) (suggesting that separation of powers is be-
coming more meaningful in the States); Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1882-98 (discussing the
differences between federal and state legislatures and judiciaries); see also Robert A. Schapiro,
Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
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Federal separation-of-powers doctrine limits the power of federal
courts to strike down federal legislation, on the ground that un-
elected judges should not be given the chance to frustrate the will of
the majority, except in a few instances.'44 In every case involving legis-
lation, there is a chance that the court could frustrate the will of the
majority. It is easy to see that when a court strikes down legislation as
unconstitutional the court is countering the will of the majority, but
that is only the tip of the countermajoritarian iceberg. Every time a
court is asked to interpret legislation it risks frustrating the will of the
majority, because the court might come to a meaning different from
what the majority of legislators intended. 1 45 Similarly, even where the
court has interpreted the statute "correctly," the court might apply
the statute to reach a conclusion different from that which a majority
of legislators would have reached. Thus, every interaction between
federal courts and a legislative enactment brings with it an inherent
risk of contermajoritarian action.146 Because of this risk, many schol-
79, 88-94, 99-107 (1998) (arguing that differences at the state and federal level counsel against
the States' routine practice of adopting federal separation-of-powers concepts).
1+t See REDISH, supra note 15, at 5, 17-19 (discussing the theoretical legitimacy ofjudicial ab-
stention); Martin H. Redish, FederalJudicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives,
46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 707-08 (1995) (noting the Framers' intent to limit the scope of what
appointed judges can hear, to prevent them from threatening the representative branches of
government). As the Supreme Court has said, federal courts may exercise power only "'in the
last resort, and as a necessity,' and only when adjudication is 'consistent with a system of sepa-
rated powers and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through
the judicial process.'" Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (alteration in Allen) (quoting
Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 97 (1968)).
145 Evidence of this phenomenon can be seen where Congress has amended statutes in re-
sponse to interpretations with which it did not agree. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2000)) (finding that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), was not an
accurate interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (2000)).
146 Part of this difficulty lies in the nature of statutory interpretation. How is it possible to
assign a single meaning to a complex collection of words put together by a number of different
actors, subject to differing influences, through an interactive process designed to frustrate the
exercise of power? The elusive nature of statutory interpretation and how courts should engage
in it has been debated by many. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 252-54 (1992) (describing the
views of three prominent voices in the current statutory-interpretation debate: Judges Posner
and Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit and Justice Scalia). For more on the debate between
Judge Posner, on the one hand, and Judge Easterbrook and Justice Scalia on the other, com-
pare United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Easterbrook,J.), aff'd
sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991), superseded by statute, Mandatory Mini-
mum Sentencing Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 80001 (a), 280001, 108 Stat. 1985,
1985, 2095 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000)), as recognized in United States v. Clark, 110 F.3d
15 (6th Cir. 1997), with id. at 1331-38 (Posner, J., dissenting). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 275 (1990) (discussing whether an objective method of statutory
interpretation is possible); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 23-29 (1997) (outlining a textualist theory of statutory interpretation); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 533 (1983) (listing the sources judges
1196 [Vol. 9:5
Sept. 2007] JEDERAL CONSTRUCTION OF STA 7INSTI7'UTJONAL COMPETENCE 1197
ars contend that federal courts should intervene only where interven-
tion is necessary to protect the political minority from a tyranny of
the majority."'
The countermajoritarian concern is not as warranted for many
States as it is for the federal government, and thus the state court
powers need not be quite so limited. Many States elect their judges,
and once elected, because they are more accountable to the elector-
ate than are appointed judges, such judges may pose less of a danger
of frustrating the majority by creating a tyranny of the minority. 148
Even unelected state judges may arguably pose less of a counterma-
joritarian difficulty for state-law issues than do federal judges for state
or federal law issues. State judges may feel closer to their communi-
ties than do federal judges simply by virtue of the fact that state dis-
tricts are smaller.' 49 Additionally, as a part of state government, state
judges may feel more bound to that smaller community of people
and may be more active in other ways in it. 150 As a result, they may be
draw upon when interpreting statutes). For an alternate view of statutory interpretation, see
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38-47 (1994) (describing and
criticizing overreliance on text to the exclusion of other interpretive tools).
17 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 119-83 (1962) (arguing that the judicial power could be dangerous, but
that the institutional limits the Court puts on itself guard against the worst dangers); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4-9 (1980) (describing
the underlying theory of the Constitution as grounded in the notion of government by the ma-
jority); STEPHEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH?:
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 177-87 (2002) (criticizing recent Supreme Court juris-
prudence with respect to both constitutional and statutory interpretation); Redish, supra note
144, at 707-08 (describing the countermajoritarian difficulty). But see Cynthia R. Farina, Statu-
tory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 500
(1989) (suggesting that courts might have a role in defining public policy).
148 See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive
Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 414 (1999) (remarking on the use of elec-
tions in state court regimes to hold judges politically accountable); Helen Hershkoff, Positive
Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131,
1158-60 (1999) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Positive Rights] (discussing howjudicial election results
in judicial vulnerability, which impacts decision making); Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1887
(noting the effect of elected judiciaries (citing HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, THEJUDICIAL PROCESS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 21 (7th
ed. 1998))). Of course, state judges may be ill-equipped to prevent tyrannies by the majority,
but that is an entirely separate issue being debated in states across the country. See Steven P.
Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689,
726-28 (1995) (questioning whether elected judiciaries may be unable to protect minorities
and whether they are capable of impartial decision making); Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1887
(noting that critics question whether elected state judges can sufficiently protect against the
majority (citing DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 288 (1996))); Hershkoff,
Positive Rights, supra, at 1160-61 (expressing concern over the threat to the judiciary's rights-
enforcing role when the judiciary is elected, because the judiciary will simply reflect legislative
choices).
14, See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1887 (citing Donald WV. Brodie & Hans A. Linde, State
Court Review of Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope of Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 542).
150 Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space between the Norms and
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 976 (1985).
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more likely to know what the will of the representative branches is
and what remedies are expected within the State.
This closeness is especially salient for statutory interpretation;
state judges are more likely than their federal counterparts to know
what the issues of public debate were when state legislation was pro-
posed, what the state legislature thought it was doing when it passed
the legislation, and what the situation in the State was before and af-
ter that legislation was passed. That distinction may be less important
at the trial level, where even federal districts are within a State's
boundaries, but it would apply with some force at the appellate level.
Certainly, there is little to suggest that the United States Supreme
Court is in a better position than any state court to understand why
the state legislature thought a particular piece of legislation was
needed.
State courts also have more flexibility to respond to local concerns
than do federal courts, because state court decisions are not as far
reaching, and as a result, they may be viewed as more democratically
legitimate.'"' Thus, a state judicial branch need not be restrained in
the same way that the federal judicial branch has restrained itself.
Apart from the concerns about the accountability of institutions,
federal separation-of-powers theory seeks to take advantage of a dif-
ferent kind of institutional competence: a faith in a functional divi-
sion of labor. 5 2  The federal elected branches are better equipped
than the federal courts to create national policy and were designed
that way. 5 3 Conversely, federal courts are more competent to adjudi-
1 See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1887, 1902 (commenting on the local, rather than na-
tional, scope of state court decisions, which allows for more experimentation (quoting Burt
Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 725, 732
(1981))); Burt Neuborne, Foreword, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20
RUTGERS LJ. 881, 899 (1989) (discussing the democratic imprimatur of state courts). This
flexibility, however, might limit state judges' use of politically unpopular remedies when those
remedies are called for. Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1887 n.287 (citing CHARLES M. HAAR,
SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 148-50 (1996)); see also Dan T.
Carter, "Let Justice Be Done": Public Passion and Judicial Courage in Modern Alabama, 28 CUMB. L.
REV. 553, 554 (1998) (describing the refisal of the Alabama Supreme Court to order new trials
in the infamous, racially charged Scottsboro trials of 1931).
512 Rogan Kersh et al., "More a Distinction of Words than Things": The Evolution of Separated Pow-
ers in American States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 5, 12 (1998); see alsoJohn Hart Ely, Another
Such Victoy: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legisla-
tures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 833-35 (1991) (arguing that thejudicial branch has characteristics that
make it an appropriate check on legislative power). But see Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strate-
gic Behavior in Legal Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 785, 785 (suggesting that lawmaking is not
so easily divided between adjudicative and legislative institutions).
153 See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 122 (1991) (describing
Hamilton's theory that "separation makes the powers work better" and that "power is not gen-
eralized but kept distinct in sorts or classes and understood as power to perform some definite
function (well)"); Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1891 (describing the ways in which Congress's
setup enhances its policy-making ability); AbnerJ. Mikva, WhiyJudges Should Not Be Advicegivers:
A Response to Professor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. RE%,. 1825, 1828 (1998) (arguing that both the fact
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cate disputes among parties and to say what legislation means or how
it applies to the world.1 54 Coupled with this separation of functions is
the notion that the federal government is one of limited jurisdiction,
and hence, the judicial power of federal courts is thought to be
rather narrow. "-s
The functions of state courts, on the other hand, are not limited
in this way. First, they are courts of general jurisdiction, and there-
fore, are viewed as having broader inherent powers than those of
federal courts.156  For example, state courts have always engaged in
common-law creation, while federal courts are thought to be able to
create common law only in limited circumstances.'"57 Many state con-
stitutions give the state judicial branch a broad responsibility to help
make state policy or exercise administrative power, either explicitly or
through provisions that grant positive rights to individuals. 158 Addi-
tionally, state legislative and executive branches are not necessarily
organized the same way, or with the same power, as their federal
counterparts, which lessens their special expertise or democratic re-
sponsiveness. 15" Finally, many States have mechanisms for direct,
of election and the procedures that Congress follows make it institutionally better able to craft
policy for the nation); David L. Schapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519,
551-58 (1988) (comparing the institutional advantages of courts and legislatures).
154 See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1877-79 (defining the power granted by Article III in
terms of the traditional power of common-law courts to decide cases and controversies); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (describing the judicial function as one
of interpretation); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analy-
sis,1 75 YALE L.J. 517, 518 (1966) (underscoring the court's role in saying what the law is).
SeeAldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (comparing the limited jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts with the general jurisdiction of state courts), superseded by statute, Federal Courts
Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 104-650, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5104,
5113; RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86
IOWA L. REV. 735, 739, 823-34 (2001) (describing the narrowness of the federal government's
powers as a structural constitutional principle).
156 See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1888-89 (remarking that state courts can often hear
claims in substantive areas, arising tinder both the common law and expansive state constitu-
tions, that federal courts cannot); Mark H. Zitzewitz, Comment, State v. Krotzer: Inherent Judi-
cial Authority-Going Where No Court Has Gone Before, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1060 (1997) (de-
scribing the inherent authority claimed by state courts).
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (determining that there is no gen-
eral federal common law and, rather than discerning principles of such nonexistent general
common law, federal judges are to apply the law of the State in which they sit); see also Martha
A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 885 (1986) (dis-
cussing the scope of power of federal courts to create federal common law); Michael Herz,
Choosing Between Normative and Descriptive Versions of the Judicial Role, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 725, 733
(1992) (noting the policy-making aspect of creating common law); Harry H. Wellington, The
Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 486 (1982) (describing the perception that the scope
of udicial review should be limited)..i8 See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1863-75, 1880-82, 1889-94 (describing the various ways
in which state courts exercise power that Article III courts lack and the ways in which state con-
stitutional provisions might differ from federal provisions).
1,9 See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1895-98 (emphasizing that Article Ill's preference for
legislative lawmaking on the federal level is not similarly expressed in state constitutions or divi-
JOURNAL OF CONSTrIUTIONAL LA W
rather than representative democracy,""° which some commentators
suggest necessitates greater state-court vigilance to protect against
tyrannies of the majority made possible by a less deliberative form of
lawmaking. 6' Based on the different institutional competencies of
state courts and state representative branches, there is little reason to
assume that state separation of powers must play out the same way as
in the federal system.1
6 2
Because the issue of state separation of powers is fundamentally a
matter of state constitutional law, federal courts should leave that
balance to the States as a unitary entity. Where the state court inter-
preted a state statute, its very exercise of interpretation struck a par-
ticular balance. Even if the state court exceeded its powers under the
state constitution, the issue is one that should be left to the States to
resolve. In fact, because of interbranch cooperation in state systems,
it may be significantly easier for state legislatures to correct erroneous
state court decisions than it is for Congress to correct erroneous fed-
eral rulings. 63 Federal courts, even if they have to power to do so,
should not intervene. Therefore, federal courts should defer to the
sions of power); Rossi, supra note 142, at 1359-62, 1375-80 (discussing the strong nondelega-
tion principle in state constitutional law and other differences in organization of State powers).
160 33 COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 233 tbl.5.14 (2000).
161 See Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 527, 529 (1994) (noting that racial and ethnic minorities are particularly vul-
nerable to the plebiscite breach); John F. Cooper, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend State
Constitutions: A Concept Whose Time Has Passed, or a Vigorous Component of Participatory Democracy at
the State Level?, 28 N.M. L. REV. 227, 258-59 (1998) (examining the concern that "some delibera-
tive process does exist in the drafting of legislative proposals that is not available for initiative
petitions") (emphasis in original); Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative
Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 421,
435 (1998); David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of Initiative and Referendum Proc-
ess, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 13, 40-42 (1995) ("direct democracy offers no deliberative alterna-
tive"); cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law,
86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 974-84 (1988) (considering the problem of interest-group capture of
plebiscites).
162 See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225,
1307 (1999) (discussing the different effects that result when an institution or practice is ap-
propriated from one government to another). Despite this fact, some commentators suggest
that the States ought to mimic the federal system. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Account-
ability in State Government and the Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 23 (1998) (proposing that state and federal courts adopt the same ap-
proach to the constitutional requirement of judicial independence); Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr.,
Toward a New Partnership: The Future Relationship of Federal and State Constitutional Law, 49 U.
Prr. L. REV. 729, 736 (1988) ("We simply cannot reason or argue about what state constitu-
tional law should be without resort to principles of federal constitutional law.... .").
163 The combination of lawmaking by referendum; the smaller, more localized lawmaking
body; and the use of advisory opinions all work to limit the power of the state courts to frustrate
the will of the people. Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 148, at 1162-66. Many states also
allow for much easier amendment of their state constitutions, providing a more significant
check on the state courts' powers to interpret their own constitution. Id. at 1164. My own State
of Alabama reflects an extreme in this regard, with 777 amendments as of the date this Article
went to press. ALA. CONST.
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balance struck by state courts and accept the interpretation offered
by the state court in an exercise of that balance, unless there is an
important federal interest that would conflict with that deference.
IV. To DEFER OR NOT
We could adopt a number of different approaches to federalism
or get rid of it entirely in favor of a unitary system. Instead, for struc-
tural, functional, qualitative, economic, or philosophical reasons,165
we, as a country, have retained not only a federal structure but a sys-
tem of judicial federalism in which much of the development of law,
both state and federal, is done by state courts. 166 And if we have held
on to this federal arrangement for the value of diversity and experi-
mentation or to promote individual liberty or community, we should
erode it only after deliberation and consideration of the effects of
such erosion.
Fundamental to maintaining states as separate from the federal
government is the ability of the State to define itself through its own
constitution. And given the starting point of analysis in this Article,
that the primacy of a branch of government is a matter of state con-
stitutional law, our inquiry necessarily must turn to explore what in-
terest might be sufficient to warrant not deferring to the state judicial
branch once it has struck a balance of state powers and interpreted
state law. In order to prevent inadvertent erosion of federalism, that
reason would have to be a relatively strong one that promotes some
substantive federal interest apart from uniformity for the sake of uni-
formity.
The most compelling reason not to defer would be a circumstance
in which the federal court has a reason to suspect the state court of
working to frustrate a federal right or a federal interest. 167 For exam-
ple, where the state court deviated from prior state law in a way that
violated due process, as the Supreme Court found had happened in
16 Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996) (deferring to the Colorado Supreme Court's
interpretation of the purpose of a constitutional amendment); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458
U.S. 527, 543-45 (1982) (treating the purpose of a proposition to amend the California Consti-
tution as an issue of fact, although that court agreed that the purpose stated in the proposition
was the actual purpose); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1967) (deferring to the state
court's interpretation of a state constitutional provision).
165 These terms are described by Michael Solimine and James Walker as some broad labels
applicable to some of the schools of thought about federalism. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note
18, at 8-9.
166 See id. at 33 (describing the Hart and Wechsler paradigm in which state courts have some
responsibility for defining and enforcing federal law).
167 See PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-
STATE RELATIONS 83 (5th ed. 2004) (describing the possible problem of unlimited state author-
ity to define contracts undermining the Contracts Clause of the Constitution); Fitzgerald, supra
note 51, at 158-71 (discussing the theories of federal supremacy and due process that are used
tojustify federal policing of state court decisions).
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NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson1 8 and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 69 the
federal court would have a constitutional duty to intervene. In this
way, state courts might interpret state law in a way that frustrates re-
view by federal courts and hampers enforcement of important federal
rights. "0  Conversely, the most compelling reason to defer would be
where the state-law issue was truly discrete from any federal issue,
such that no federal interest could be said to be at stake.
Short of these situations, deciding whether to defer is much more
difficult. The vast majority of State action is reviewed under a stan-
dard that is designed to be quite deferential: rational-basis review. 71
In fact, rational-basis review is so deferential that some commentators
have suggested that it is not review but is instead the absence of re-
view, the refusal to commit judicial resources to subjects outside of
core constitutional concerns. Rational-basis review does not en-
force any substantive right or enumerated power. 17" Rather, it is a way
to limit the countermajoritarian power of Article III judges.174 Thus,
rational-basis review embodies a policy of deference to the federal
legislative branch as well as to the States. However, the rational-basis
test does not enforce any positive constitutional delegation of power
to the state legislative branch that would justify not treating the States
as unitary entities.
And so, on the one hand, it is easy to see why, as a function of ac-
cepted notions of federal institutional competence, federal courts, in
exercising rational-basis review, reflexively defer to the legislative
branch, any legislative branch, at the expense of any gloss a court has
put on the law. But as explained above, assessing institutional com-
petence at the state level is not for federal courts to address in most
6 357 U.S. 449, 457 (1958).
19 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964).
170 See Fitzgerald, supra note 51, at 87-90 (arguing that the Supreme Court should defer to
state-court judgments, unless the Court explains why it has reason to suspect the States of frus-
trating the operation of federal law).
171 See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277,
1282-84 (1993) (critiquing the application of rational-basis review to laws burdening the poor);
Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflecting on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW.
U. L. REX'. 410, 410-11 (1993) (noting that constitutional jurisprudence identifies very few
classes for heightened review).
172 Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 148, at 1153; see also Loffredo, supra note 171, at
1282-84 (explaining the very deferential review of laws burdening the poor); Sager, supra note
171, at 410 (discussing the Court's minimum protection of economic rights).
173 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution,
103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 49 (1989).
174 See MICHAELJ. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 84-95 (1994)
(describing judicial minimalism); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy (pt. 1), 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 (1998) (discussing the ongoing
debate over the ability of an unelected branch to overturn popular decisions); James B. Thayer,
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, Address at the Congress
on Jurisprudence and Law Reform (Aug. 9, 1893), in 7 HARV'. L. REX'. 129, 144 (1893) (noting
the different obligations of legislators and judges in interpreting the Constitution).
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instances. 1 75 The question of institutional competence is a matter of
state constitutional law in the first instance, making it a question
more properly dealt with by state courts under the Supreme Court's
notions of dual federalism. Thus, without some substantive federal
interest to enforce, federal courts have no good reason not to defer
to state court interpretations of state law.
One could argue that the federal interest at stake is uniformity;
the rational-basis test must mean the same thing everywhere it is ap-
plied. 7 7 Uniformity is an important federal interest, but only when it
serves to protect federal sovereignty and supremacy. If the federal
government has no sovereignty interest, it has no interest in uniform-
ity. To say otherwise would take us to the world envisioned by the
Supreme Court in Swit v. Tyson,7 where the development of com-
mon law by federal courts spread uniform common law throughout
the country for the sake of uniformity alone. Going there is certainly
a choice we could make as a society, but we have not made it, and the
Supreme Court specifically rejected it in Erie. 179 Without a substantive
federal interest to be enforced by the rational-basis test, it is difficult
to see why federal courts should exercise independent judgment on
an issue of state law any time a state court has spoken.
At the opposite end of the review spectrum, where a fundamental
right is at stake, or a suspect class affected, the federal constitutional
test to apply would be strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, unlike rational-
basis review, is employed to enforce substantive federal constitutional
values of equality and liberty. The Fourteenth Amendment repre-
sents a fundamental shift of power away from the States and to the
federal government to protect individual rights.8 0 Individual rights
to liberty and equality are at stake even where strict scrutiny is not
employed, and the Fourteenth Amendment places vindication of
those rights primarily in the federal government.s" So perhaps the
proper touchstone here is simply whether a liberty or equality issue is
' For examples of when the institutional competence of state courts may need to be exam-
ined in order to protect individual rights, see Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 148, at 1159-
60.
176 See Schapiro, supra note 15, at 1409 (noting that, under Erie, interpretation of state consti-
tutions rests with with the high court of each State).
177 But see Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1483-86
(2005) (noting an inevitable lack of uniformity in the application of even ostensibly uniform
federal tests).
17s 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
179 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80.
180 See Aynes, supra note 133, at 66-74 (describing early theories of incorporation of the Bill
of Rights against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment); see also McCormick, supra
note 66, at 370 (noting that Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment because States could
not be trusted to sufficiently protect equality and liberty).
181 See McCormick, supra note 66, at 370-71 (suggesting that this arrangement maximizes
liberty and equality for all citizens).
JOURNAL OF CONSTIUTIONAL LA W
at stake. If so, federal courts have an interest that warrants exercising
independent review, not deferring to at least some state court inter-
pretations.
Certainly, however, there are reasons to defer even here. For ex-
ample, allowing States to interpret their laws narrowly so as to avoid
federal constitutional questions strengthens the quality of state gov-
ernment by allowing the state judicial branch to participate in enforc-
ing the Federal Constitution. It also limits the extension of constitu-
tional principles without a solid foundation. So federal courts, it
would seem, have stronger reasons both to defer and not to defer in
the strict-scrutiny context.
In either context, where the state court is overprotecting a federal
interest or underprotecting a state interest, it is difficult to see what
federalism value is promoted by failing to defer to the state-court in-
terpretation of state law. 182 One argument for not deferring to state-
court interpretations could be that if States wish to deviate from the
federal model, they should do so by grounding decisions in their own
constitutions, rather than by relying on federal constitutional princi-
ples. In other words, let the States be politically accountable for their
decisions rather than suggesting that the federal government is re-
sponsible. 183
By not allowing state courts to shift responsibility, federal courts
may enhance political responsibility in a more positive way as well.
States and localities are given the chance to use the state political
process to remedy constitutional violations, which may give those
remedies greater credibility with the people of the State, which, in
turn, should make those remedies more effective. 18 4 The effective-
ness of the remedy is enhanced not only by the chance for democ-
ratic resolution, but also by the fact that it is chosen by insiders rather
than being imposed from outside. 18 5 Experimentation by state legisla-
tures may lead to a greater ability by the states to develop innovative
182 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1249 (1978) ("Unless competing constitutional concerns are at
stake, there would seem to be no occasion for an abiding federal judicial role in policing state
courts against overly generous interpretations of federal constitutional values."). Justice Stevens
has repeatedly raised this issue in dissents to cases that reverse an overprotection of federal
rights. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2540-41 (2006) (Stevens., J., dissenting); Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 695 (1986) (Stevens,J., dissenting); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1067-70 (1983) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
183 This seems to be the gist of Scalia's concurrence in Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2530-31
(Scalia, J., concurring), in which he discusses the difficulty of Kansas voters remedying the state
supreme court's error. So Scalia, it seems, would argue that this accountability is essential to
the political process because voters must know how to change the law that a state court is apply-
ing if they do not agree with a result.
184 See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1900-01 (noting the Court's approach of giving States
the opportunity to address their equal protection and due process violations).
185 Id. at 1902.
[Vol. 9:5
Sept. 2007],EDERAL CONSTRUCTION OFSTA TF INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE 1205
ways to remedy constitutional problems. 116 That innovation benefits
us all. 8 7 This state innovation, however, might be achieved by ensur-
ing a strong role for the state judiciary, regardless of whether the
constitutional limit state courts rely on is a federal or state one.
This inquiry has implications far beyond the meaning or purpose
state courts find as well. State courts' processes necessarily impact the
deference equation. For example, for a brief period of time the
Connecticut Supreme Court adopted a method of statutory interpre-
tation different from the method used in federal courts., That court
held that it could use any contextual information to interpret the text
of a statute, even if that text was not ambiguous. That approach is
contrary to what is called the "plain meaning rule," which is used by
federal courts and which allows a court to consult extratextual mate-
rials only when statutory language is ambiguous.8 9 The method of
statutory interpretation should be a matter negotiated between the
States' legislative and judicial branches, and not necessarily imposed
from outside, unless that method is somehow used to frustrate a sub-
stantive federal interest. Similarly, State choices regarding the
amount of deference reviewing state courts give to lower state tribu-
nals may differ from the level of deference given by their federal
counterparts. It is difficult to see how that decision implicates any
substantive federal interest that would warrant imposing the federal
model on the States. Ultimately, a lack of deference could impact the
States' abilities to interpret the substantive provisions of their own
constitutions where those constitutions mirror the language of the
Federal Constitution, or perhaps even where similar rights are only
186 In his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, Justice Brandeis expressed this point in a
now-famous line: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
187 See id.; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, 46 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1385, 1387-88 (2005) (demonstrating that liberal moral progress, such as the
right to gay marriage or the right of the terminally ill to die with dignity, comes about through a
process of invention by a single State, propogation to other States, and then consolidation
within the federal system).
ass See State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 582 (Conn. 2003) (explicitly rejecting the plain-
meaning rule used by the Unied States Supreme Court in statutory interpretation), superseded by
statute, Act of June 26, 2003, 2003 Conn. Pub. Acts 154 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-2z (West 2005)). The Connecticut legislature enacted a statute to overrule that part of
Courchesne, and the Connecticut Supreme Court acquiesced without analyzing whether the legis-
lative overruling was valid under the state constitution. Goodyear v. Discala, 849 A.2d 791, 796
n.4 (Conn. 2004) (citing Paul Dinto Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. City of Waterbury, 835 A.2d 33, 39
n.10 (Conn. 2003)). Despite the fact that Connecticut no longer deviates from the federal
method, the example remains a useful illustration of the possibility that a State could makes this
change.
189 See Courchesne, 816 A.2d at 578-86 (explaining reasons for rejecting the plain-meaning
rule and adopting instead a broader inquiry into the meaning of the statutory language in all
cases).
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mentioned. Even for those who argue against a dual-federalism
model, this result would encroach too far into State autonomy and
sovereignty.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal courts encounter state-law issues in a great variety of situa-
tions, with varying levels of state-court interpretation attached. To
date, federal courts have treated state courts sometimes as if they
were lower federal courts and sometimes as if they were the courts of
completely separate sovereigns, without explaining why. While this
lack of transparency gives federal courts the greatest amount of dis-
cretion and power, it does little to support the legitimacy of federal
courts. This Article has attempted to describe when the Supreme
Court will defer and when it will not, and it has found that difference
somewhat counterintuitive and in conflict with the Supreme Court's
notions of dual sovereignty. While dual sovereignty might be neither
truly possible nor desirable in the age of the administrative state, it
can provide some practical boundaries to divide the labor of the
courts in our federal system when they necessarily interact. Thus, this
Article has suggested that federal courts defer to state courts unless
an issue presents a substantive federal interest that warrants inde-
pendent federal review. I hope that this provides some normative
guidance that the courts could consider in negotiating those interac-
tions.
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